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(brief title: Muslim charity in a Colombo housing scheme) 
 
Filippo Osella (Department of Anthropology, Sussex University) and Tom 
Widger (Department of Anthropology, Durham University) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Recent research on contemporary modalities of Islamic or Muslim philanthropy has 
focused on processes of subjectivation through which givers and recipients of charity 
are habituated or craft themselves to an ethic of piety, social responsibility and 
(neoliberal) economic virtuosity. These studies, however, have concentrated almost 
exclusively on those who give charity, leading to an over-emphasis on the 
perspectives of givers, and on their role in determining how the poor might deal with 
their everyday lives and imagined futures.  As a result, small-scale gifting relations in 
which the Muslim poor may also be involved—making the poor simultaneously 
givers and recipients of charity—have been obscured or erased altogether. In this 
article we argue that the concerns of the poor might not always or necessarily be those 
of the wealthy donors of charity.  By receiving and giving sadaqa and zakat, poor and 
working class Muslim in a Colombo neighbourhood imagine inclusion and belonging 
to the wider Muslim community in Colombo which is not contingent upon the 
mediation and pedagogical interventions of charitable organizations and (middle-
class) pious donors. Importantly, this imagination of inclusion and belonging comes at 
a time when the Muslim poor are increasingly marginalized by virtue of a (middle 
class) discourse which by framing charity as a means ‘to help the poor to help 
themselves’ has turned socio-economic upliftment into an ethical duty, and, 
consequently, failure to improve oneself has become the symptom of wider moral 
shortcomings.  
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‘The practice of zakat is not just intended to temporarily alleviate suffering. By 
demonstrating an example of virtue and duty, granting zakat encourages all members 
of society to work harder, to be compassionate, and to improve the lot of the 
community. Zakat is, therefore, both spiritual and profoundly social’.2 With these 
words Tariq Cheema describes the scope of Islamic charity at a time when, ‘Muslim 
philanthropy is at a crossroads,’ because, ‘it faces the challenge of building new, 
global models of giving, whilst refining the old methods embedded in Islam’s vibrant 
religious and cultural traditions.’3 Indeed such a reformist task is taken up by World 
Congress of Muslim Philanthropists of which Tariq Cheema is the founder and CEO.   
Established in 2007 by ‘a small group of dedicated individuals’ it includes illustrious 
patrons such as, amongst others, H.R.H. Banderi A.R. Al Faisal of Saudi Arabia and 
H.R.H. El Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan.  
Tariq Cheema’s vision of a global Muslim philanthropic network devoted to turning 
religious giving into a means for socio-economic progress and development draws on 
a time-honoured Islamic tradition of almsgiving,
4
 and chimes with current debates 
within the Muslim world regarding the scope, direction and ethics of mandatory 
(zakat) and voluntary (sadaqa) almsgiving. Contemporary concerns about the 
inherent potentials of almsgiving have emerged at the intersection of a number of 
related, and simultaneously global and local processes of transformation.  It has been 
argued that with mass education, increased literacy and the spread of new media 
technologies there has been an increased fragmentation of authority in Muslim 
societies, leading to the development of a ‘heightened self-consciousness’ of Islam as 
a religious ‘system.’5  The consequent development of what Dale Eickelman and 
James Piscatori identified as a new ‘Muslim politics’ has gone alongside the 
emergence of novel forms of civic and social activism associated, in some instances, 
with the rise of so-called political Islam.
6
  Research has indicated that many 
expressions of present-day social activism—of which contemporary forms of 
organized charity are an expression—are not only responsive to the weakening of 
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 T. Cheema, ‘The World Congress of Muslim Philanthropists: A strategic Approach to Strengthen 
Muslim Giving’, at www.thewcmp.org/img/downloads/pdf/Muslim_Philanthropy0.pdf (accessed 13th 
October 2013), p. 1.  
3
 Ibid. 
4
 The importance of almsgiving has led Decobert to suggest that early Islam constituted an ‘economie 
aumoniere’, an economy sustained by the circulation of alms from the wealthy to the poor.  Likewise, 
Singer has argued that the extensive provision of assistance for the poor in the Ottoman empire was 
characteristic of a ‘welfare society.’. C. Décobert, Le mendiant et le combattant: l'institution de l'islam, 
Seuil, Paris,1991; A. Singer, Charity in Islamic societies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2008.  See also A. Sabra, Poverty and charity in medieval Islam: Mamluk Egypt, 1250-1517, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000. 
5
 D.F. Eickelman and J. Piscatori, Muslim politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996, p. 39.  
See also Deeb on the ‘authentication’ of Islam; L. Deeb, An enchanted modern: gender and public 
piety in Shi’i Lebanon, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006. 
6
 See eg A. Bayat, , ‘Islamism and social movement theory’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 6, 
2005, pp. 891–908; A. Bayat,, Making Islam democratic: social movements and the post-Islamist turn, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2007; Q. Wiktorowicz, The management of Islamic activism: 
Salafis, the Muslim brotherhood, and state power in Jordan, State University of New York Press, 
Albany, 2001; J. Clark, Islam, charity and activism: middle-class networks in Egypt, Jordan and 
Yemen, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2004; R. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and 
democratization in Indonesia, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000; Deeb An enchanted 
modern.  
 3 
state-sponsored social welfare programmes, but appear to be congruent with novel 
forms of capital accumulation engendered by global processes of economic 
liberalization.
7
  That is, the Islamization of public and private life and state-led 
neoliberal reforms have come together to produce the twin effects of the Islamization 
of the social and the marketization of Islam.  Here religious proselytization and ethics 
of market entrepreneurship are brought together in the orientations and practices of 
emerging modalities of social activism and organized charity, expressive of a novel 
imagination of the relations between state, market and religiosity aptly glossed by 
some as ‘pious neoliberalism’.8  Such an ‘ethicalization of market rule through 
humanitarianism, philanthropy, and the affect of poverty action’9 has a purchase 
beyond the experiences of social actors in Muslim majority countries or in locales 
where Muslims are deemed a ‘minority community.’   The stuff of contemporary 
modalities of (organized) Muslim religious giving—motivating middle class Muslims 
to donate time and money to redress failures of state and market in promoting the 
common good, or encouraging the poor to utilize charity they receive to transform 
themselves into economically active and pious Muslims—resonate with an emergent 
global form of governing
10
 in which neoliberal capitalism is both the problem and the 
condition for its solution.
11
  That is, the imagination of a moral economy engendered 
by charity, voluntarism and humanitarianism is located in the rhetoric, aesthetic and 
practices of the market itself, as expressed, for instance, by the practices of 
philathrocapitalism.
12
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 There has been a renewed interest in the connection between contemporary Islam and global 
capitalism.  Largely drawing on the Weberian legacy of Geertz’s attempts to relate specific religious 
orientations to different economic practices, emerging scholarship identified and explored specific 
middle-class projects—oft coalescing around wealthy entrepreneurs—drawing together various strands 
of Islamic reformism, notions of ‘community development’ and the demands of neoliberal capitalism.  
See eg. P. Sloane, Islam, modernity and entrepreneurship among the Malays, St. Martin's Press, New 
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political Islam in Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 38, no. 2, 2002, pp. 187-204; P. Haenni, 
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good’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, vol. 15, no. S1, 2009, pp. S202-S221; D. 
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University Press, Ithaca, 2010; M. Atia, Building a house in heaven: Islamic charity in neoliberal 
Egypt, University of Minnesota Press, 2013; S. Tobin, Everyday Piety: Islam and Economy in Jordan, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2016. 
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 Rudnyckyj Spiritual economies.  See also O. Karaman, ‘Urban neoliberalism with Islamic 
characteristics, Urban Studies, vol. 50, no. 16, pp. 3412-3427; Atia Building a house in heaven; Tobin 
Everyday Piety. 
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 A. Roy, ‘Ethical Subjects:   Market Rule in an Age of Poverty’, Public Culture, vol. 24, no. 1, 
p.107.   
10
 See D. Fassin, Humanitarian reason: a moral history of the present, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 2012; P. Redfield, ‘Bioexpectations: life technologies as humanitarian goods’, Public 
Culture, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 157-184. 
11
 Typically in so-called ‘bottom of the pyramid capitalism’, see J. Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession: 
NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in Cairo, Duke University Press, Durham, 2005; J. 
Elyachar, ‘Next practices: Knowledge, infrastructure, and public goods at the bottom of the pyramid’, 
Public Culture, vol. 24, no. 1, 2012, pp. 109-129. 
12
 See eg. D. Rajak, In good company: An anatomy of corporate social responsibility, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2011. 
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Recent research on charity and philanthropy in the Muslim world and beyond has 
explored ways through which neoliberal market practices and ideologies have 
engendered new forms of religiosity, and, at the same time, how the latter have been 
mobilized to inform economic practice.  This two-way traffic has afforded a novel 
and productive perspective on the relations or affinities between religious and 
economic life beyond the all too obvious anthropological trope of the ‘moral 
economy’.13  If scholars in the 1990s had explored and theorized modernist 
objectifications of Islam as a ‘religious system,’ current research on emerging forms 
of Islamic or Muslim philanthropy has shifted attention to processes of subjectivation 
through which givers and recipients of charity are habituated or craft themselves to an 
ethic of piety, social responsibility and (neoliberal) economic virtuosity.
14
  We 
suggest, however, that historical affinities between accumulation of religious merits 
and capital enabled by practices of almsgiving—in the Muslim world as much as in 
other religious traditions and locales—should make us at least cautious in attributing 
to neoliberalism alone the power to co-opt religiosity as a means to foster or shore up 
economic practice, and vice-versa.
15
  At the same time, we note that religious giving 
might be embedded in a relation between self and the divine entailing theological and 
aesthetic dispositions towards mercy, compassion or love which are oblivious of, or 
altogether reject, neoliberal market logic.
16
  Moreover, the concerns of the wealthy are 
not always the same as the concerns of the poor.  All too often we see in the available 
literature an assumption that the ideals and aspirations of wealthy benefactors to 
create specific kinds of subjects of their receivers have their intended effects.  As 
such, we doubt the quasi-hegemonic status often attributed to theologies and practices 
underpinning contemporary forms of organized almsgiving in Muslim societies.  
Socio-religious pedagogies directed towards transforming the spiritual and material 
lives of (middle-class) givers and (poor) recipients via religious giving, we argue, are 
inevitably shot through with instabilities, contradictions and slippages.   
More specifically, we intend to focus on the life-worlds of those who have become 
the object of the concern and intervention of charity-minded individuals and 
organizations.  This article has an obvious ethnographic scope in that studies of 
Islamic and Muslim charity have single-mindedly focused on those who give 
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 The most remarkable example of this trend is Rudnyckyj Spiritual economies, but see also Tobin, 
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Disquieting Gifts: Humanitarianism in New Delhi, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2012; A. 
Mittermaier, ‘Beyond compassion: Islamic voluntarism in Egypt’, American Ethnologist, vol. 41, no. 3, 
2014, pp. 518-531. 
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charity,
17
 and as a result little is known about the experiences of recipients, and the 
relationships produced by the distribution of zakat and sadaqa.  This has led to an 
over-emphasis on the perspectives of givers, and on their role in determining how the 
poor might deal with their everyday lives and imagined futures.  And as a result the 
subjectivation of the recipient-poor is taken for granted, assumed as the inevitable 
outcome of socio-religious pedagogies of charitable interventions mobilized by the 
givers.  At the same time, small-scale gifting relations in which the Muslim poor may 
also be involved—making the poor simultaneously givers and recipients of charity—
has remained substantially unexplored and under-theorized.  Drawing inspiration 
from the anthropology of giving in South Asia,
18
 in this article we will underscore the 
perhaps all too obvious fact that acts of charity, or giving more generally, might be 
understood very differently depending upon the position of those who participate in 
the exchange.  
Data for this paper were collected in Sri Lanka’s capital Colombo between 2012 and 
2013.
19
  Whilst in this Sinhala-Buddhist dominated island Muslims make up for 
roughly 10% of the total population, they account for 36% of Colombo’s inhabitants 
(11% in the Colombo district as a whole).  The vast majority of Colombo (and Sri 
Lankan) Muslims are Sunni who follow the Shafi’i schools of jurisprudence, but there 
are also two other Muslim communities with origins in northern India, Memons and 
Bohras. Although their population is small, these two groups are extremely successful 
in commerce, from tea plantations and international trade to retail. There is no space 
here to summarize the rich history of Sri Lankan Muslims,
20
 but suffice it to say that 
they are a Tamil-speaking community whose Colombo-based middle-class elite rose 
to commercial prominence during the British colonial period, and later benefitted of 
the opportunities opened up by Sri Lanka’s adoption of a policy of economic 
liberalization in 1977.  However, the majority of Colombo Muslims continue to eke 
out a living in low paid precarious jobs, and populate inner-city low-income 
neighbourhoods such as Slave Island, Pettah and Maradana. Fieldwork was conducted 
at a time when Sinhala Buddhist xenophobia had led to virulent, and oft violent anti-
Muslim campaigns, making the Muslim minority increasingly anxious about its 
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 See eg. J. Benthall and J. Bellion-Jourdan, Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World, 
IB Tauris, London, 2003; A. Fauzia, Faith and the state: a history of Islamic philanthropy in 
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‘Articulation of Physical and Social Bodies in Kerala’, Contributions to Indian Sociology, vol. 30, no. 
1, 1996, pp. 37-68. 
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 This research was carried out in collaboration with the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA), 
Colombo, and was supported by a generous grant from ESRC/DfID (grant no. ES/I033890/1) for which 
we are grateful. We also thank Sarah Kabir for her valuable help with fieldwork. 
20
 See D. McGilvray, Crucible of conflict: Tamil and Muslim society on the east coast of Sri Lanka, 
Duke University Press, Durham, 2008; M.A. Nuhman, Sri Lankan Muslims: ethnic identity within 
cultural diversity, International Centre for Ethnic Studies Colombo, Colombo, 2007. 
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vulnerability, and sensitive to criticism alleged exclusive and inward orientation.
21
 
Muslims were accused of gaining unfair advantage over the Buddhist majority by 
circulating economic resources within the community—Muslims, for instance, are 
chided for patronising only Muslim shops and restaurants, for investing in Muslim-
owned business, and so forth.  The extreme poles of wealth and poverty in the Sri 
Lankan Muslim community, alongside a growing sense of embattlement in the face of 
rising anti-Muslim Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, work to create and shape the senses 
of obligation on the part of the rich to give and of the rights of the poor to receive. 
Charity, Muslims and Islam in Colombo 
Rather the seeking to define Muslims’ almsgiving with reference to Islamic canon,22 
we begin by outlining the contours of the moral reasoning through which Colombo 
Muslims understand and practice giving zakat and sadaqa.
23
 We notice here a 
plurality of positions, but also a good deal of agreement across a socially diverse body 
of givers.  Predictably, members and supporters of formal and informal Muslim or 
Islamic organizations which collect and distribute charity in the capital city and across 
the Island criticise the wastefulness of ‘traditional’ giving, oft caricatured as donation 
of cash to beggars during the month of Ramadan.  The argument here is that 
individual and indiscriminate giving not only reproduces dependency and encourages 
begging, but also does little to alleviate the root causes of poverty.
24
  The latter are 
routinely identified as the outcome of lack of (religious and secular) education and 
skills, which, in turn, lead to unemployment, family instability, inability to plan life 
and defer gratification, promiscuity, criminality, and plain laziness.  On the contrary, 
the millions of rupees Muslim distribute every year as zakat and sadaqa could and 
should be pooled together and utilized to ‘help the poor to help themselves’, to 
engender substantial and permanent transformations in their lives.  Some, especially 
so-called ‘secular’ Muslims, justify such a move in terms of efficiency and efficacy, 
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 See D. McGilvray,‘Sri Lankan Muslims: between ethno‐ nationalism and the global ummah’, 
Nations and Nationalism, vol. 17, no. 1, 2011, pp. 45-64; A. Ali, ‘Political Buddhism, Islamic 
Orthodoxy and Open Economy: The Toxic Triad in Sinhalese–Muslim Relations in Sri Lanka’, Journal 
of Asian and African Studies, vol. 49, no. 3, 2014, pp. 298-314. 
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 See eg. J. Benthall, Financial worship: the Quranic injunction to almsgiving’, Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute, vol. 5, no. 1, 1999, pp. 27-42; K. Retsikas, ‘Reconceptualising zakat in 
Indonesia: Worship, philanthropy and rights’, Indonesia and the Malay World, vol. 42, no. 124, 2014, 
pp. 337-357. 
23
 Central to Islamic orthopraxis, zakat has been linked to prayer, a religious obligation performed by 
giving a percentage of one’s wealth to specific categories of (Muslim) deserving recipients.  It is 
distinguished from voluntary almsgiving, sadaqa, albeit in the two words are often used 
interchangeably. Whilst it can be considered as a tax, and indeed historically it has often been collected 
alongside other taxes, zakat suggests notions of purification and increase. By giving a percentage of 
one’s wealth, the remainder is purified. Albeit the ultimate reward for one’s generosity is only 
experienced in the afterlife, the act of giving entails the promise of increased material prosperity and 
accumulation of religious merits. Whilst the incumbency of giving zakat normally falls only on those 
Muslims whose accumulated surplus during a full lunar year exceeds a certain threshold, sadaqa is not 
regulated by normative rules and can be given by anyone to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  See 
Benthall ‘Financial worship’; Atia Building a house in heaven p.14ff; T. Kuran, ‘Islamic redistribution 
through Zakat: Historical record and modern realities’, in M. Bonner, M. Ener, and A. Singer (eds.), 
Poverty and charity in Middle Eastern contexts, State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 
2003, pp. 275–93; Singer Charity in Islamic societies. 
24
 See also Atia Building a house in heaven. 
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borne out both by the experience of the somewhat chaotic post-tsunami relief efforts, 
and by the need to uplift
25
 the community as a whole through systematic development 
projects.  For religious-minded Muslims who participate in the activities and funding 
campaigns of formal and informal charitable organizations—especially those close 
the Islamic reformism of groups such as Tablighi Jama`at and Jama’at Islam—the 
pragmatic discourse of development goes alongside an emphasis on the spiritual 
transformations which charity should elicit in recipients.  Here giving zakat is both a 
duty to God and to the Muslim community as a whole, a means to foster material and 
spiritual well-being amongst recipients.
26
  Whether zakat as the right (haqq) of the 
recipients on a portion of the surplus of the donor should preclude conditions on its 
use or not,
27
 formal and informal charitable organizations have established systems of 
checks and references—often provided by local mosques or government employees—
to ensure would-be-recipients’ ‘reputation’ as practicing Muslims and to establish 
their genuine economic needs.  Direct provision of adequate sanitation, drinking water 
or housing are preferred over individual cash transfers as the latter might be too easily 
‘squandered’ by dissolute recipients. 
The practices of contemporary organizations devoted to the collection and distribution 
of Muslim charity in Colombo reveal an impetus toward individual and collective 
moral responsibilization seeking to shape the Muslim poor into self-disciplined 
economic and religious subjects.  This takes the configuration of an art of reforming 
and governing the poor which does not simply objectify theologies articulated within 
specific Islamic discursive traditions, but also draws on the legacy of colonial debates 
about the idleness of the (non-working) poor and the moral value of work; neoliberal 
notions of entrepreneurship and meritocracy; the global discourse of development; the 
charitable practices of other ethnic-religious communities in Sri Lanka; as well as on 
a growing middle-class uneasiness with the public spectacle of begging.  And yet, the 
enthusiasm for organized forms of charity we find amongst certain sections of the 
Colombo Muslim middle-class—in particular young professionals and MBA-
educated businessmen, that is those who participate more enthusiastically to, and have 
benefitted more from the liberalization of the Sri Lankan economy—and Islamic 
reformist organizations has a limited purchase.  Amongst our Colombo interlocutors 
the most common practice is to give a small proportion of one’s zakat and sadaqa to 
charitable organizations, whilst utilizing the rest to respond to demands from poor 
relatives, dependants and strangers— not only beggars, but also those unable to meet 
expenses for medical emergencies, life-cycle rituals, education expenses or payment 
of utilities bills— as well as to support religious institutions.  Eventually, the impulse 
and obligation to give cannot be turned unequivocally into a project of socio-religious 
reform. For many Colombo Muslims who give alms to the poor on a regular basis—
shopkeepers and traders in downtown Pettah Bazaar for instance—zakat and sadaqa 
remain primarily concerned with the transformation of the (donor) self rather than 
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 Reference is often made as much as to the times of the Prophet Muhammad and of the first four 
‘rightful’ Caliphs as exemplary of the virtues of centralized collection and distribution of zakat, as to 
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zakat should be utilized in the service of piety and public welfare.  See M. Bonner, ‘Poverty and 
Economics in the Qur'an’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 35, no. 3, 2005, pp. 391-406; C. 
Décobert, Le Mendiant et le combatant: l’institution de l’Islam, Seuil, Paris, 1991; Kuran ‘Islamic 
redistribution’. 
27
 See also Retsikas ‘Reconceptualising zakat’. 
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with the long-term material and spiritual welfare of recipients.  That is, they are a 
means to discharge a religious obligation, accumulate religious merits and ensure 
success in one’s economic endeavours. 
Here we do not intend to draw the lines of a hard and fast opposition between the 
demotic practices of popular Islam and the universalist orthodoxy of Islamic 
reformism.
28
  After all the vast majority of donors amongst our respondents shared the 
view that almsgiving should foster long-term economic development and discourage 
dependency, and all strived to lead the moral life appropriate to God-fearing Muslims.  
Instead we simply foreground the complexity and plurality of understandings of 
everyday practices of religious giving amongst Colombo Muslims.   
The spaces and places of Muslim charity  
Waseer Watta
29
 (a pseudonym) is a small administrative sub-division in the north-east 
of Maradana, one of the more down-at-heel areas of north-central Colombo 
notoriously associated with excessive consumption of alcohol and illegal drugs, and 
more generally for a plethora of ‘underworld activities.’ Waseer Watta, like Maradana 
and north Colombo area, is primarily Muslim, with around 60 per cent of the 
population registering in the latest census as either ‘Sri Lankan Moor’ or ‘Malay 
Muslim,’ the majority defining themselves as Moor30. The remainder are Sinhala 
Buddhists, Catholics, and Evangelical Christians. The community comprises of 25 
encroached ‘houses’31 and 160 National Housing Scheme (NHS) flats across 11 
blocks.  The NHS flats were built in the late 1980s to early 1990s by the United 
National Party government of Ranasinghe Premadasa, space for which was made by 
clearing existing slum dwellings and rehousing families in the blocks. One block is 
known locally as the ‘luxury flats’, larger than the standard apartments in the rest of 
the blocks. Residents say there are three classes of housing in the watte: the luxury 
flats, which are ‘class one,’ the remaining majority of the NHS flats, which are ‘class 
two,’ and the remaining encroached houses, which are ‘class three.’  
The ethnic and class stratification of the Muslim inhabitants is objectified in their 
accommodation arrangements, which in turn impacts upon the charitable activities of 
people in the watte. Thus residents of the ‘first class’ luxury flats all claim to give 
zakat at Ramadan as required by their economic level; very few residents of class two 
flats do so, and none of those in class three encroachments. By contrast, none of those 
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 For a critique of this binarism, see F. Osella and C. Osella, ‘Introduction: Islamic reformism in South 
Asia’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 42, nos. 2-3, 2008, pp. 247-257.  See also F. Haniffa, ‘Piety as 
politics amongst Muslim women in contemporary Sri Lanka’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 42, nos. 2-3, 
2008, pp. 347-375.   
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‘underserved settlements’ in urban areas. Reflecting local practice, we use two spellings of ‘Watta’ in 
this paper. We use the formal ‘Watta’ when referring to the community by its name (i.e. Waseer Watta) 
but the vernacular ‘watte’ when referring to the community generally. 
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 Sri Lankan Moors constitute the country’s largest Muslim community, and claims descent from Arab 
traders who settled in Sri Lanka from the mediaeval period. The Malay Muslim community originated 
from South-East Asia and settled in the island during the Dutch and British colonial periods.  See 
McGilvray Crucible of conflict; Nuhman Sri Lankan Muslims. 
31
 ‘Encroached’ communities are simply those located on government or private land not belonging to 
the residents, and which have no planning permission or legal entitlements to remain. By other terms 
encroachments would refer to ‘slums’ or ‘shanties’, although those terms are not commonly used in Sri 
Lanka. 
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in first class flats claim to receive charity from others, while the majority of those in 
class two flats, and all of those in class three encroachments do so.  Importantly, 
however, people in class two and three housing complain that class one residents 
ignore their neighbours in the watte, and do not give them charity, even at Ramadan.   
We note that none of the wealthy Muslims who give zakat in the neighbourhood are 
natives of Waseer Watta.  Of the five most active donors, three reside elsewhere and 
two lodge in the watte on a temporary basis. The ways in which they imagine their 
connections with and responsibilities to the local Muslim residents informs the 
calculations they make on what and to whom to give, and, as we shall see, the 
responses of recipients.    
Finally, the inhabitants of class two and three housing also receive welfare support 
from a wide range of organisations and individuals, from the central government and 
the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC), to an array of secular and religious voluntary 
organisations and philanthropists of various stripes.  Crucially, although the watte is a 
space of considerable charitable intervention, its working class and often of modest 
means, if not altogether poor inhabitants are actively engaged in various modalities of 
charitable giving.    
 
Giving charity in Waseer Watta 
Take Jameer, 42, a businessman who runs a chain of hardware stores, Orabi Traders, 
along with his five brothers.  We are introduced to Jameer by the trustees of the local 
mosque as ‘someone who gives zakat.’ Jameer has a close-cropped beard and is 
dressed in a smart black shirt and trouser set, and is described as a well-known figure 
in the local community deeply involved in the development of the mosque and its 
activities through the use of money he makes through Orabi Traders and other 
ventures. Throughout our interview, which appropriately enough is held in the office 
of the Waseer Watta mosque, Jameer is keen to share his knowledge of the scripture 
relating to zakat and sadaqa and the mosque trustee defers to him on several points of 
detail relating to the economic, social, and moral calculations of charity that he 
makes. In this sense Jameer resembles many wealthy Muslim businessmen who 
appear to invest a very high level of time and energy in the calculation and giving of 
zakat in the pursuit of ‘social mindedness’ (Osella & Osella 2009).  
Jameer was born in Akurana, a Muslim town in the Kandy District, where some of his 
brothers still reside. Orabi Traders was started by Jameer’s father in the 1980s and 
when he was still alive he took responsibility for distributing zakat and sadaqa based 
on company assets, while the brothers each gave from personal assets.  Jameer 
describes his father as a very pious man who was deeply involved in charitable works, 
right up until the time of his death, ‘when he was 77 he personally went and gave 
houses to one hundred tsunami victims,’ Jameer explains. For Jameer, his father’s 
lessons in business and charity, as intimately related activities, have been a founding 
principle of his life. So when the father died and the brothers assumed control of the 
company, each continued to combine the pursuit of business and charity and they 
calculate zakat based on what they individually own in the company, while still 
calculating how much to give based on personal assets. When zakat based on 
company assets is given, the brothers generally agree together how much this should 
be and who should receive, but when they give from personal assets they usually 
decide alone.  
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Social calculations—to whom to give—are complex.  In cases of both company and 
personal zakat the brothers look to give to the categories of beneficiary as they are 
defined in zakat canon, ‘depending on their proportion in the community.’  For Jameer 
this translates into four main categories of recipient: company employees, so they can 
build or improve their home (this initiative was started by his father and is carried on 
by all the brothers); the Baithul Zakat committee in Akurana, which distributes 
according to its own rules, but tends to also focus on home building and 
improvements; poor relatives and other villagers in Akurana; and poor residents in 
Waseer Watta.  The poor in the ancestral village and the watte are given money to 
start a business, build or improve their home, or to marry off children.
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Jameer’s spiritual calculations resemble those expressed by other successful traders, 
businessmen and professionals in Colombo. He explains that zakat does not belong to 
him but to those who are eligible to receive; as such it would be a sin not to give and 
failure to do so would incur grave misfortune in business and in life, and be met with 
punishment after death. ‘If you give your property will be pure. It will be protected 
from disasters and all problems,’ Jameer says. But Jameer also regards his 
involvement in the watte facilitated by zakat as helping the community’s social, 
moral, and spiritual upliftment, a responsibility shared by his brothers stemming from 
their economic position. This is particularly expressed in terms of increasing mosque 
attendance, which Jameer sees as a key obligation his brother and he have acquired 
due to their wealth, 
We have a connection with people here [in Waseer Watta]. We are spreading a 
message to come and pray here [in the Waseer Watta mosque]…When you 
have this much money you have to help them. 
Jameer further explains that zakat can directly help to alleviate the economic and 
social problems that ravage communities like Waseer Watta. By helping men and 
women to become self-sufficient—for example by starting a business, driving a 
trishaw, becoming a seamstress – or helping families to avoid getting into debt when 
children marry, zakat can reduce the flow of fathers, and especially mothers to the 
Gulf states as migrant workers, which is generally regarded as leading to high levels 
of school-drop out and drug addiction amongst Muslim youth. The moral obligation 
that Jameer feels to give is extended to recipients as a moral obligation to improve 
themselves through the pursuit of more social and religious-minded behaviours, at the 
centre of which stands the safeguard of women’s modesty.  He feels beholden to 
Waseer Watta because it is a poor community in close vicinity of one of his business 
outlets and adjacent to the mosque in which he usually prays. At the same time, 
Jameer’s confabulations about the requirements and scope of zakat reflects his 
support for Tablighi Jama’at’s efforts to reawaken Islam amongst Muslims. 
Jameer’s charitable endeavour and high aspirations are tempered in less well-off zakat 
givers in the watta. Thajun, 43, is an announcer on Sri Lankan Broadcasting Company 
radio programmes in Tamil. He lodges in a second-class flat given over to rent by the 
owners, which he shares with his brother, who works in a middle-management 
position in the Ministry of Education, and two other men.  Educated at secondary 
school level, Thajun is married but his wife and two children live in Ampara, his natal 
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 Jameer’s brothers, meanwhile, may also give to these categories and more. For example, one brother 
living in Akurana has joined forces with friends to create an informal organization that pools a part of 
their zakat which is then given to help widows start their own businesses so they will not feel 
compelled to take a second husband. 
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town on the east coast of the island.  We meet Thajun in his flat. He is sat behind a 
small desk rehearsing some radio scripts, and is pleased of the chance to take a break 
to talk about zakat and Islamic charity.  Thajun explains that he has lived in Waseer 
Watta for just over one year, and during Ramadan he gave zakat to some poor 
neighbours he had come to know, as well as to beggars who knocked at his door. But 
he also gives zakat to people in Ampara, as well as to a mosque committee and 
community development organisations active in some remote Muslim villages in the 
Ampara District.  Thajun explains his charitable endeavour with reference to what he 
understands as the to be the appropriate ways of giving zakat in the Quran, 
If you go by the correct order then you give first to family, then beggars, then 
organisations…Organisations include normal village groups, like a social work 
group that goes and looks at the needs of the people and try to respond to them. 
For Thajun, however, the zakat he gives to the mosque committee and development 
organisations is reckoned to be more effective than that which he distributes directly. 
And so he criticises those Muslims who insist on giving zakat personally, for whom a 
close relationship with beneficiaries and the possibility to control where their own 
money goes is considered of prime importance,  
Zakat committees identify the needs of the poorest communities. At the end of 
Ramazan they produce a report of who donated and what the money was used 
for. If you give to beggars who come to the door you can give money but it’s 
not really beneficial. So it’s better if an organisation does it. But some people 
demand an intimate relationship with beneficiaries… 
Other wealthy Waseer Watta residents, though, feel hardly any responsibility to the 
neighbourhood. The watte rarely figures in their zakat calculations, and they prefer 
instead to give charity in their natal villages in which they maintain a strong sense of 
belonging.  Nimis, a 42 years old medical doctor, lives with his wife in one of the 
‘luxury’ flats in the watte.  But he spends most of the week in his native Kalmuni on 
the east coast of Sri Lanka where he owns some land and a house, and where he runs 
a private medical practice.  Nimis’ wife Janas explains that they calculate zakat 
according to the value of their house and land on the east coast, and then give the 
amount to a mosque in Kalmuni.  Like Thajun, Janas says they prefer to give to the 
mosque rather than directly to deserving people because they only have a small 
amount to offer, and this way what they give, ‘can have more impact.’  She stresses 
the importance to calculate zakat correctly and to distribute it to rightful recipients, 
failure to do so would be meted out by God’s punishment, through a sudden drop in 
their future income, for instance. Janas explains,  
What we give is not a lot, it can’t change people’s lives. But if you give to the 
mosque they can collect from many people and change lives. The mosque 
committee knows the correct way of giving, and you can be sure that your 
money goes to the correct categories [of recipients]. 
The narratives of our Waseer Watta respondents reflect the complex social and ethical 
reasoning underpinning about the giving of zakat, and almsgiving more generally, 
which we have found amongst middle class Muslims in Colombo.  Giving zakat 
affords the fulfilment of a religious obligation, and the cultivation of pious 
dispositions, an alignment of one’s life to God’s will and command which brings 
rewards in the everyday as much as in the afterlife.  But for some, it also entails the 
objectification of a duty of care for the material and spiritual welfare not only of those 
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with whom exists a degree of familiarity, but also of the poor in the watte.  The stories 
of those who receive zakat reveal an equally complex reasoning, both consonant and 
discordant to that of givers.   
Receiving charity in Waseer Watta 
Let us return to Jameer talking to us in the Waseer Watta mosque.  After he finishes 
speaking we are introduced to Hasim, who is described to us as ‘a poor man who 
received help from Orabi Traders.’  At the beginning of the interview both Jameer and 
the mosque trustee remain in the room and Hasim speaks in general terms about his 
life and the struggles that he faces and how the generosity of men like Jameer helped 
him through hard times. But when they both leave Hasim starts to talk about the 
problems he experiences obtaining help from wealthy Muslims, zakat in particular.  
Hasim has a large family—seven children, including two daughters and five sons— 
and feels the economic burden intensely. The oldest child is married and has left 
home; one son has finished education but is unemployed; and the remainder are still 
in school. Hasim used to work as a daily-wage labourer for a mason, but he was 
forced to retire after an accident. For a while he drove a trishaw, but the daily rent of 
Rs. 350 he had to pay to hire the vehicle was too high, he rarely broke even let alone 
made a profit.  Nowadays Hasim assembles handbags from home for a local shop, 
working on a piece-rate of Rs. 100 per bag, completing on average two or three bags 
per day.  He explains that although his income is insufficient to provide for his 
family’s daily needs, forcing him to take loans from local money-lenders to make 
ends meet, he has ‘too much läjja [shame]’ to ask for help from men like Jameer.  
When wealthy businessmen come to the watte at Ramadan to give zakat outside the 
Mosque, he won’t even send his own wife as he doesn’t want her to ‘go and queue 
and beg.’  Hasim finds fault both with the ways in which zakat is distributed—
normally going to the ‘very poor’ already known to the giver, or to the latter’s 
relatives and acquaintances—and in how potential recipients are required to demand 
zakat.  Hasim recognises that although zakat is an obligation to give and a right for 
the poor to receive, in practice things do not work that way. He explains, 
Although it [zakat] belongs to the poor you shouldn’t ask. They [the 
donors] should think and give. But they are giving priority to relatives and 
the very poor. Many people are coming to help but only if we know them 
personally will they come to us. Then the problem is that people who 
don’t get [zakat] will create issues and so they [the givers] might get fed 
up and leave this community. 
The one exception Hasim remembers is when his eldest daughter reached 
marriageable age and he had no money or savings to buy her jewellery and pay for the 
wedding.  He went to speak to the mosque administration and they told him they 
could ‘match him up with someone who gives zakat.’ The mosque gave him the 
details of Orabi Traders, whom a female relative then contacted on his behalf.  Orabi 
Traders responded by giving Hasim some jewellery—including a gold chain—and 
sponsored the wedding meal.  Hasim suggests that zakat could give him the resources 
to develop his handbag business or to buy a trishaw, the chance to earn a decent 
living.  But he doesn’t foresee this ever happening. 
Other respondents reinforce Hasim’s pessimism.  Fifty-three years old, Muzamil is 
married to Fazlia who is five years younger than him, the couple earn around Rs. 600 
per day between them. Muzamil drives a trishaw and Fazlia cooks food for local 
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eateries.
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 Muzamil explains that every Ramadan two former Waseer Watta residents 
distribute zakat from the mosque: one handing out Rs. 2000 notes, and the other 
dispensing dry rations (rice, sugar, milk powder, flour) from the back of a truck.  
While Muslims and non-Muslim residents of the watte queue to collect the donations, 
neither his wife nor he do so. The problem, Muzamil suggests, is that,  
There are some very wealthy Muslim men who come at Ramadan and give 
money next to the mosque, but I don’t take. But if someone comes to my 
doorstep then I will take. I don’t want to stand in queues, it is shameful. 
When interviewed Muzamil had a daughter who was about to marry, and like Hasim 
this was causing him some concern. Not wishing to go cap in hand to the mosque or 
to wealthy Muslims he didn’t know personally, Muzamil was, as he put it, ‘constantly 
going to ask relatives for money.’  This was something Muzamil thought he could do 
because his relatives were ‘close to [his] level’, and he could reciprocate at a later 
date. For Muzamil, then, the nature of the relationship he has with a would-be-giver 
defines the degree of moral and status concern experienced by asking for zakat and 
other forms of help. 
Alongside recounting personal experiences of receiving zakat and the moral dilemmas 
that often come with it, Waseer Watta Muslims were also concerned with those who 
appeared in the neighbourhood during the month of Ramadan and extended charity in 
a haphazard way. Two somewhat ephemeral and unnamed characters did exactly so 
because of a past connection with the watte. As young men they had migrated to 
Colombo from the east coast, Waseer Watta was the first place they lived in the 
capital, lodging in spare rooms and bunking up with friends. In time they both became 
successful gem traders and moved away, but every year they return to distribute cash 
from the steps of the mosque to a queue of women.  Poor Muslims in the watte have 
mixed feelings about this.  They spoke of the shame it brings to the community, 
making local people look and feel like common beggars. Some argued that these two 
donors did not even bother to ascertain whether the recipients were actual Muslims or 
not, insisting that some of their Sinhala and Tamil neighbours would don hijab and 
masquerade as Muslim women to receive zakat. Yet others embraced the inclusivity 
of this somewhat indiscriminate form of giving, arguing that through their largesse the 
two former residents of the watte are helping to maintain good relations between 
watte residents of different ethnic-religious communities.  
Charity given and received  
Charity received from wealthy Muslims, and zakat especially, features large in poor 
Muslims’ stories of help they receive. At its best zakat is reckoned to have real 
transformative potential, but in every instance investigated only small amounts of 
assistance were ever extended. However, charity from wealthy Muslims constitutes 
only an irregular source of help.  In the everyday that which is given by relatives, 
neighbours, and friends who are closer to one’s own economic standing is ultimately 
more predictable and of more benefit.  As such, the vast majority of our poor Muslim 
interlocutors in Waseer Watta give as well as receive. 
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 Fazlia’s operation is larger than most of these home-based catering industries common across 
Colombo wattes: she works from a kitchen set up in the front room of their modest flat, and is assisted 
by her daughter as well as Muzamil when he’s not out looking for hires. 
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For Muzamil, who we have met earlier, giving sadaqa (voluntary almsgiving) is an 
important part of being a Muslim. For him giving has little to do with social welfare 
or community upliftment, it is about obtaining merits from God. Muzamil tells us that 
with his modest daily income of Rs 600 he is an ēḻai aḷ (poor man) but he is not 
totally destitute as a pichchaikkāraṉ (beggar), and so he can give to those who are 
poorer than him. He also stresses the importance of not boasting about one’s 
generosity, echoing the popular refrain that, ‘the left hand should not know what the 
right had is doing.’ 
Whenever I give to the poor I think about getting merits from God. I always 
taught my wife and children to give without others seeing. You’ll get more 
blessings if you don’t just give for society. It’s not a social duty. I think about 
God. That’s why it’s best not to be seen giving charity. 
Although Muzamil prefers to ask relatives for help because he can give them 
something in return, when he gives he likes to do so without reciprocity.  
I don’t expect anything in return from my brothers if I give them something. 
Even if they are millionaires I wouldn’t expect anything in return. It doesn’t 
matter if they’re relatives or not, it’s about God. We are God-fearing people! 
One category of people that Muzamil refuses to give to, however, is beggars. Like 
many Muslims in Waseer Watta, he considers beggars to be a menace who trouble 
hard-working folk with their endless demands. Running a food business means 
Muzamil has more beggars on his doorstep than most, and he finds himself chasing 
them away. Only at Ramadan does Muzamil break this rule, when, he says, it’s bad to 
turn people away who ask for help. 
Muzamil’s daughter Shafeena is 29 years old, and lives in the flat next door to her 
parents’. She married Majeed in 2001, and they have two young children.  Educated 
to Grade 6, Shafeena is a housewife, but also helps her mother prepare food; Majeed 
was educated to Grade 10, and works as an agent for an overseas recruitment 
company. Although Majeed earns only Rs.15000 per month, the couple like to give 
sadaqa on a regular basis.  Like her father, Shafeena believes that charity should be 
given discretely and without ‘showing off.’  Indeed, as a household with a small 
income, giving charity could be construed as an attempt to distinguish themselves 
from equally poor neighbours, of acting above their ‘level.’ Shafeena describes giving 
sadaqa as a religious obligation, one that is best discharged individually and directly 
to recipients, because even the mosque might misappropriate what they collect, 
It’s our religious obligation to give. We might not trust the mosque as they 
might be using the money for other things. But God knows we’re giving it. 
However Shafeena also distinguishes charity given to non-relatives from charity 
given to relatives.  Both entail moral commitments, but the former is an obligation to 
God, whilst the latter is embedded in kinship responsibilities. She explains,   
Husband sends money to his family. He sees this as an obligation because 
she’s his mother. Your mother raised you so it’s like something you have to 
do. It’s a sin if you don’t do it but it’s more for the love you have for your 
mother. 
In this family, then, charity is thought about and practiced along lines of both piety 
and relationality, seeking to avoid publicity or supporting unworthy recipients. 
However, for Saleem and Rizana, a couple living in encroached housing, beggars are 
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worthy recipients for their charity.  Saleem works in a factory and Rizana is a 
housewife, and they have six children to support on a meagre income.  Rizana 
explains that they give sadaqa at Ramadan in the form of raw rice to people who 
come to the door and ask; and sadaqa as cash to beggars at other times of year.  
Compared with the normative rules regulating the calculation and distribution of 
zakat—which they are anyway too poor to give—for Rizana the fact that any action 
conducted with the intention of helping others can constitute sadaqa means that even 
poor households can engage in pious as well as humanitarian deeds.   
This is a stance that we have found across many Muslim households in Waseer Watta, 
where those living on the edge of destitution give whatever they can when they can.  
In a second class flat we meet Wazeer and Mazly.  Wazeer, a trishaw driver, was 
educated to Grade 8 and Mazly didn’t receive any schooling at all.  She is a 
housewife, but like many poor women in the watte she also makes food to sell to a 
local eatery. Combined, they can earn no more than Rs.1500 per day. Like other poor 
Muslim households they receive fitra at the end of Ramadan,
34
 and also sadaqa from 
various sources throughput the year, but have never received zakat.  Although 
themselves in receipt of fitra and in need of help, at the end of Ramadan Wazeer and 
Mazly also like to give fitra—rice, milk powder, sugar, and tea—‘to people who 
don’t have.’ Mazly explains,  
In the month of Ramadan we get and we give also. If someone comes and says 
they have nothing to eat, then we give at any time. Why do we do this? We are 
searching for blessings. If we give, we get! 
Poor Muslims in Waseer Watta who give sadaqa and fitra deploy a complex and 
diverse economic, social, and spiritual reasoning when doing so. For some giving 
sadaqa to strangers is a pious act, and one that is close to an obligation; at the same 
time giving ‘help’ to relatives is not considered charity but a relational obligation. 
Across households we also encounter expressions of giving for humanitarian and 
social reasons, as part of a commitment to generalised notions of care for the 
unfortunate and destitute.  Indeed it is impossible to distinguish the motives of poor 
Muslims who give sadaqa in terms of any one reason. Rather what we find are 
complex engagements with ethics of piety, relationality, and humanitarianism. 
Whether giving should engender either material or immaterial returns – giving to 
obtain blessings, or future success and social status—or indeed both, is a concern 
which is debated in the watte with regard to poor Muslims who give zakat. 
While most poor Muslims in Waseer Watta frame their charitable activities as sadaqa, 
some define it as zakat.  Predictably, mosque trustees, as well as wealthy men like 
Jameer campaign against the use of the term zakat to describe poor Muslim’s 
charitable endeavours.  For them, this transgression of Islamic orthopraxy-- the 
obligation of zakat should fall only on Muslims whose surplus wealth (nisab) held for 
a full lunar year exceeds a specified level—is explained as ignorance of Islamic 
doctrines and practices that the mosque can rectify through sermons and education. 
Nevertheless poor Muslims who claim to give zakat are steadfast in their 
interpretation of their actions, and when pushed counter any argument that is raised 
against them. There are several possible understandings of what is taking place here, 
ranging from a lack of religious knowledge as the mosque would insist, to a cynical 
                                                        
34
 Distribution of charity, especially food items, on Eid-ul-Fitr, the day that marks the end of Ramadan 
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explanation in terms of attempts to appropriating the social status associated to giving 
zakat.  Alongside these, however, stands our respondents’ insistence that poor 
Muslims can, and should be both givers and recipients of charity.  
Fayaz and Rizana, both in their early 40s, live in one of the most well maintained 
Corporation flats. Located on the ground floor, they have blocked off the door that 
opens onto the common landing.  They have opened an independent entrance to the 
flat which leads directly on a bit of land around which they have also built a high 
wall. They are also the only residents in the block to have painted their exterior walls 
a different colour.  Inside the flat the floor is paved with polished tiles, and a modern 
steel-and-glass table and chair-set are placed in the middle. Comfortable sofas and a 
coffee table are set opposite an expensive flat-screen television. Fayaz was educated 
to Grade 8 and Rizana to Grade 10. He works as a manager in a large Muslim-owned 
company, and until recently Rizana has worked in the Gulf.  Fayaz earns Rs.50,000 
per month, high by watte standards, but still too little to bring him into the level of 
wealth at which one should pay zakat, something that is affirmed by the fact that the 
family receives zakat from Fayaz’s employer at Ramadan. Nevertheless, Fayaz 
engages in a wide range of his own giving, some of which is defined as sadaqa and 
some as zakat. Alongside this Fayaz also gives to poorer relatives, described by him 
as zakat when given at Ramadan and as ‘help’ (Tamil: udavlam) when given at other 
times of the year.  
During Ramadan we give zakat to family members first and then after to non-
relatives. At other times of the year we give clothes and other items to 
different people [as sadaqa]. People come and ask for money for weddings. 
This is sadaqa. During the month of fasting, zakat is something you have to 
give. It’s a religious thing you have to do but it’s also something we like to do 
– it’s not a bother….But the help we give to family members [at other times] 
is not sadaqa or zakat. We see it as help.  
With their separate doorway, high walls, consumer goods, and managerial position, 
Fayaz and Rizana are clear social climbers interested in distinguishing themselves 
from their less fortunate neighbours. In that sense the claim to give zakat is easily 
understood as forming part of the same narrative of distinction. The giving of zakat, 
though, is possibly within their reach. Perhaps by acting as if they can give zakat 
today, tomorrow they really will be able to.  Even so, Fayaz describes his zakat as 
being driven by piety, and in this sense he occupies the same social and moral space 
as men like Jameer who see no contradiction between their business aspirations, and 
religious and humanitarian commitments.
35
 
For other Muslims in the watte the possibility of economic success seems remote, yet 
they still insist they can give zakat.  Mahood is 66 years old O-level educated man 
who works as an odd-job electrician and handyman, earning around Rs.300 per day.  
Mahood is also one of the few Muslims in the watte to collect government welfare 
payments, totalling around Rs.600 per month.  Mahood says he receives fitra from the 
mosque at Ramadan, and help from his mother-in-law’s relatives. He has a learned 
disposition, and as we sit in his flat he embarks on a monologue about the similarities 
between Islam and Christianity, which he sees as many.  This is a time of protest 
across the Muslim world against a film purportedly made in America that defames the 
life of the Prophet Mohammad. Tensions are also starting to run high in Colombo and 
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Mahood wants to stress that both Islam and Christianity are religions founded on the 
principle of charity. For Mahood, then, giving is a way of life, something that can and 
should promote harmony across society, and a practice he has pursed since childhood.  
Mahood is also keen to stress that he gives according to the principles of zakat as well 
as of sadaqa. He differentiates between that which he calculates as a percentage of his 
income and can only be given to Muslims (zakat), and that which can be any amount 
and can be given freely (sadaqa). For Mahood, however, the ability to give zakat is 
not reckoned in material terms but spiritual terms. Thus the opportunity to give zakat, 
to give to less fortunate Muslims at the most auspicious time of year, Ramadan, 
cannot be reduced to an economic demand, but is something that all good Muslims 
should be aware of regardless of their economic level.  Mahood challenges the 
requirement of having in excess of Rs. 500,000 in untouched assets in order to be 
obligated to give zakat,  
Even as a small child we had to give. It’s a religious obligation. We have to 
give to people below our level. Is it zakat? Even if you only have ten rupees 
you can give two-and-a-half per cent!’ 
Mahood’s cry that he can give zakat ‘even if you only have ten rupees!’ is expressive 
and joyful and signals a deep pleasure that he can do so. For Mahood, giving zakat is 
something that can be chosen and not only bestowed as a duty.  There is little to 
suggest that Mahood associates zakat with either economic success or the pursuit of 
‘social mindedness.’  Here giving is an act entirely distinct from other considerations 
beyond fulfilling God’s command, and performed spontaneously.36  
Conclusions: charity and the problem of ‘the poor’ 
The ethnography we discussed emphasizes the heterogeneity of Muslim charity in 
contemporary Colombo, whereby different orientations and practices not only co-
exist, but actually work through each other.
37
 We note that whilst the vast majority of 
our respondents would agree that coordinated and centrally collected charity might be 
more effective, many feel a commitment to supporting individuals or families with 
whom one has long-term personal relations, be them relatives, employees, former 
clients or simply poor neighbours in the ancestral village. This might be more explicit 
and evident in the case of those who prefer to distribute in person at least a share of 
their zakat.  But the various projects or schemes of formal and informal charitable 
organizations follow similar geographical trajectories, whereby donations in kind or 
cash tend to move from Colombo to the donors’ natal or ancestral villages, 
reproducing long-term commitments and relational obligations.  Individual donors 
and organizations continue to give zakat and sadaqa, in whatever form is distributed, 
to those with whom they have long-term relations.  This is seldom rationalised with 
reference to the categories of rightful recipients of zakat mentioned in the Qur’an and 
Islamic canon.
38
 More commonly our respondents referred to an ethico-religious duty 
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37
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Fuqara: those who own property in excess of basic necessities but below the value of nisab; Masakeen: 
Persons of extreme poverty who possess no wealth whatsoever; Aamileen: those persons who are 
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of care for those who, for a variety of reasons, cannot make ends meet and have to 
depend on others for the necessities of everyday life, described in the Qur’an as 
fuqara (sing. faqir).  Materialised by giving zakat and sadaqa, such a duty of care 
should expand from one’s kin and relatives, to dependants and neighbours, and 
eventually to the wider community along a vector of decreasing intimacy and 
relational obligations.   
If it is normally accepted that giving to those to whom one is closest is the most 
efficient and effective way to take care of those in need,
39
 we have found an increased 
concern about ‘poor people’ (Tamil ēḻai makkaḷ), a relationally more distant category 
of persons whose spontaneous demands for help and assistance are nowadays 
stereotyped, and reproved as akin to begging (Tamil pichchai eṭu).   The pedagogy of 
charity articulated by many of Colombo’s (formal and informal) Muslim charities, as 
well by the followers of Islamic reformist organizations is specifically directed to 
transforming not only spiritual and material well-being, but also the cultural and 
social dispositions of the socially and relationally distant, and hence unknown and 
anonymous poor.  Here, individually selected, scrutinised and assessed by 
organizations standing for an anonymised body of givers, ‘the poor’ are turned from 
nameless bodies enabling the exercise of religious obligations into knowable and 
known objects of moral scrutiny and intervention.  In the meantime, the beggar (tamil 
pichchaikkāraṉ) is increasingly seen as a nuisance, bothering respectable households 
with incessant demands and giving a bad name to the Muslim community. Moreover, 
one can never be certain whether the beggar is genuinely indigent or a ‘professional’ 
mendicant making good money out of fellow Muslims’ compassion and piety.  To 
boot, rumours abound of non-Muslims putting on a skullcap to beg for money from 
Muslim houses or shops.  That is, the morally threatening and unruly beggar—the 
wretched miskin appearing in the Qur’an as an ambiguous stranger deserving of 
privileged charitable attention
40—is tamed through bureaucratic practices—
application forms, letters of recommendation nowadays routinely demanded by 
donors—which deny mendicants the power to eliciting donations by appealing to the 
‘impulse to give’ of the Muslim public.41 However, attempts to erase beggars from the 
practices of almsgiving are interrupted every time a trader or shopkeeper who comes 
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out of the mosque on a day he is doing some important deal gives plenty to 
mendicants to ensure a successful outcome, knowing that money given as alms will 
return multiplied.  And in any case giving alms to beggars who visit Colombo’s 
Pettah Bazaar’s shops on Fridays remains the most common and routine of charitable 
activities by all commercial establishments in area. 
Waseer Watta’s poor residents’ refusal to stand in queues to receive zakat might be 
interpreted as the expression of a wider South Asian awareness of the hierarchies of 
status produced and reproduced through the politics unreciprocated gift giving.  And 
yet the shame they experience is not just the humiliation of demanding and receiving 
assistance from others, but the realization that eliciting support from strangers is 
nowadays unescapably marked by the indignity of begging.  The well-meaning and 
pious Muslim donor who forces the watte’s poor to queue ‘like beggars’ to receive 
zakat is well aware of the differences between ēḻai aḷ (poor man) and pichchaikkāraṉ 
(beggar).  And yet, he acts as he does because in contemporary middle class and 
Islamic reformist discourse those who demand charity and receive it in person and 
publicly by individual donors are perceived and represented as ‘beggars.’  In turn, the 
conflation of the practices of the poor begging calls for and justifies the work of 
purification
42
 enacted by charities and individuals through the introduction of 
bureaucratic procedures and the articulation socio-religious pedagogies of upliftment.  
That is, once the relationally distant poor have been turned to the categorical status of 
beggars, in order to become the object of charitable intervention they have to be 
reassembled into ‘deserving poor’.   
Waseer Watta’s residents, though, are keen to point out that donations handed out by 
individuals or organizations are never enough to provide a degree of social protection 
for those whose livelihood is at the best precarious.  Eventually the financial help 
extended by kin, friends and neighbours is more easily accessible and reliable.  
Moreover, by claiming the right to give as well as to receive religious charity, and by 
drawing attention to the continuity between the ethics of almsgiving and the morality 
of relational obligations, Waseer Watta’s residents assert participation within a 
‘community of believers’ constituted at the intersection of two related modalities of 
reciprocity: reciprocity to God via pious acts of charity, reciprocity to fellow residents 
and kin via relations of mutuality and co-dependence. By receiving and giving sadaqa 
and zakat, poor and working class Muslim in the watte, then, imagine inclusion and 
belonging to the wider Muslim community in Colombo which is not contingent upon 
the mediation and pedagogical interventions of charitable organizations and (middle-
class) pious donors. Importantly, this imagination of inclusion and belonging comes at 
a time when the Muslim poor are increasingly marginalized by virtue of a discourse 
which by framing charity as a means ‘to help the poor to help themselves’ has turned 
socio-economic upliftment into an ethical duty, and, consequently, failure to improve 
oneself has become the symptom of wider moral and religious shortcomings.
43
 
It is precisely at this intersection that we find fertile ground for a reconsideration of 
charity, not just in terms of understanding the lives of the poor who receive but also 
the poor who give.  There has been a growing interest in recent years in the 
motivation of the ‘humanitarian poor’: the argument simply stated is that feelings of 
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affinity with other poor people leads the poor themselves to give charitably whatever 
and whenever they can.
44
  In our Waseer Watta ethnography we find not just evidence 
of sympathy for the fellow poor but an opportunity to express and embody piety and 
community through the gifting of charity to family, friends, and neighbours. Yet 
while for wealthy men like Jameer this does involve an attempt to refashion the moral 
lives of the poor, for impoverished men like Mahood, giving is understood as an 
action undertaken in and for itself alone, devoid of moral demands on the recipients. 
By making this argument we do not wish to romanticise the charity of the poor, nor to 
naively position it as the antithesis of a hegemonic charity of the wealthy middle 
classes. Instead, by exploring the charity of the poor in and through their life-worlds, 
we wish to highlight how, at least for some Waseer Watta people, giving charity 
offers a chance to stand apart from the normative pedagogies of what Atia defines as 
‘pious neoliberalism.’45 The poor give not simply because of the debts of mutuality46 
to which they are beholden as the residents of tight-knit communities, nor the 
strategies of aspirational social climbers intent on distinguishing themselves from 
poor kin and neighbours. As our ethnography has shown, these and complex other 
motivations lead the poor to give, through modalities at times analogous and at other 
times dissimilar to the wealthy.  
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